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A European Union global strategy for a changing world? 
Karen E. Smith, LSE  
 
Abstract: The EU agreed a ‘global strategy on foreign and security policy’ in June 2016, in 
the midst of unprecedented turmoil within the EU and outside it. This article begins with a 
discussion of what ‘strategy’ entails, and the challenges of strategizing in the EU. It then 
traces the development of the EU global strategy, focusing on why it was considered to be 
necessary, and summarises its content. Finally, the article analyses the new strategy in terms 
of clarity of strategic objectives, specification of resources dedicated to the pursuit of those 
objectives, and provision for monitoring of progress made in achieving the objectives. The 
global strategy provides a more ‘realist’ guide for EU foreign and security policy in the near 
future, but Brexit presents a severe challenge to implementing it in a world in which EU 
influence is increasingly resisted or contested.  
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Introduction 
The Global Strategy of the European Union (European Union 2016) was welcomed 
by the European Council on 29 June 2016, just days after the British voted to leave the 
European Union (EU). ‘Brexit’ will have a negative impact on the United Kingdom (UK) and 
the EU, including in the field of foreign and security policy, though the extent of the damage 
depends on the eventual agreement reached between the UK and the EU (the closer the 
relationship, the fewer negative repercussions for the economy, geopolitical influence, and so 
on, of both sides). But in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, the 
EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini said 
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that she wanted to present her initiative for the Global Strategy (EUGS) despite the 
uncertainty over the UK-EU relationship because it would help boost the EU’s confidence 
and indicate a way forward in the field of foreign, security and defence policy (Caprara 
2016). In the months following that European Council, the EU member states have begun to 
discuss one of the principal proposals in the strategy: strengthening and deepening defence 
cooperation. Given that the UK has traditionally been the most reticent member state in that 
area, defence cooperation may be one area around which the EU27 (all the member states bar 
the UK) can unify. If this indeed happens (a big if), then the EUGS will have had, at least 
partially, the impact that Mogherini sought. However, the impact of Brexit, on top of all of 
the other challenges facing the EU, may be more damaging overall, as it drains away 
resources on which EU global action depends.  
 This article begins with a discussion of what ‘strategy’ entails, and the challenges of 
strategizing in the EU. Section 2 traces the development of the EUGS, focusing on why it 
was considered to be necessary, and then summarises its content. Section 3 assesses how 
‘strategic’ the EUGS is. It analyses the new EU global strategy in terms such as the clarity 
and prioritisation of strategic objectives, specification of resources dedicated to the pursuit of 
those objectives, and provision for monitoring of progress made in achieving the objectives. 
What challenges is the EU likely to face in implementing the strategy? Will the EUGS help 
the EU navigate the ‘changing world’? 
 
1. Strategy and the EU 
‘Strategy’, as Lawrence Freedman (2013, pp. x-xi) has noted, is an overused word with 
multiple definitions (similar to ‘power’ and ‘politics’). In a broad sense, a strategy is a plan to 
reach objectives. Strategies abound in both the public and private sectors, for good reasons, 
as Goldgeier and Suri (2016, p. 35) argue:  
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Strategic planning is important because it forces a fragmented policy 
bureaucracy to think imaginatively about how the world works and what their 
nation can achieve. Strategic planning creates space for leaders to articulate 
priorities and match diverse capabilities to overarching goals. When done 
well, it allows powerful governments to become forward-looking international 
agenda-setters, avoiding the all-too-frequent tendency to react to emerging 
crises in piecemeal fashion.  
A number of elements have been widely considered to be important building blocks of 
foreign policy and security strategies. The UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy (UK 2010, 
p. 10) states that ‘a national security strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination of 
ends (what we are seeking to achieve), ways (the ways by which we seek to achieve those 
ends) and means (the resources we can devote to achieving the ends).’ Annegret Bendiek and 
Heinz Kramer (2010, p. 456) define an EU foreign policy strategy as ‘the existence of a 
comprehensive plan for the EU’s various international relations, which also includes clear 
objectives and plans ordered according to priorities’. The external context should be assessed 
and incorporated into the overall plan, as the UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy notes: a 
strategy ‘must also take account of the activities of others: the positive contributions of allies 
and partners and of the private sector; and the negative effect of adversaries seeking to thwart 
our objectives’ (UK 2010, p. 10).  
This article will thus assess the EU Global Strategy on the basis of the following elements 
(see also Bicchi et al 2015): 
• The extent to which the EUGS is based on agreement on the shared interests and 
values of the EU and its member states in the field of foreign and security policy, 
and on a set of objectives derived from those shared interests and values; 
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• Given that resources are necessarily finite, the extent to which the EUGS sets 
priorities from among those objectives; 
• The extent to which the EGUS evaluates how the external context poses 
challenges or opportunities in terms of achieving the EU’s priorities; 
• The extent to which the EUGS assesses the instruments and resources that are 
necessary to achieve those objectives within a specified time frame, acknowledges 
the decisions that need to be taken to direct the necessary resources to their 
fulfilment and indicates the specific instruments and institutional actors that will 
need to be devoted to implementing the decisions; 
• The extent to which the EUGS includes provisions for regular monitoring and 
assessment of the progress made in implementing and achieving objectives, and 
then adjustment of priorities and resources as necessary. 
 The EU actually produces a lot of strategies. There is a ‘strategic framework on 
human rights and democracy’. There are ‘country strategies’ as well as ‘regional strategies’ 
for all of the EU’s aid recipients. The EU has ‘strategic partnerships’ with ten countries and 
several international organisations, including a ‘partnership with a strategic purpose’ with 
ASEAN. And before the EUGS, there was the 2003 European Security Strategy (European 
Union 2003) and the 2008 implementation report on the European Security Strategy 
(European Union 2008). The EU thus at first sight appears to be the kind of actor that is 
intent on setting out long-term plans and priorities for its foreign relations, and not merely 
reacting to the latest crisis. 
A closer look reveals a more problematic picture. Freedman (2013, p. 611) has noted 
that many government strategy documents have short half-lives because they: 
lack focus, cover too many dissimilar or only loosely connected issues and 
themes, address multiple audiences to the satisfaction of none, and reflect 
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nuanced bureaucratic compromises. They are often about issues that might 
have to be addressed rather than ways of dealing with specific problems. 
In fact, EU strategies almost universally tend to be about issues that have to be 
addressed rather than specific plans for dealing with specific problems with the specific 
resources available. As Bendiek and Kramer (2010, p. 456) argue:  
there are hardly any clear and long-term goals to be discernable (sic) for the 
plethora of inter-regional and bilateral EU foreign relations. While certain 
goals are commonly named in the agreements that form the basis for the 
respective relations, these documents usually lack a clear time frame, a 
prioritization of the stated objectives, effective monitoring of the achievement 
of objectives, or a systematic assessment of whether the instruments being 
used are suited for the stated purposes.  
Jolyon Howorth argued in 2010 that ‘there is no doubt that the EU needs much greater 
strategic thinking – especially in terms of the application of means to large ends’ (Howorth 
2010, p. 463). External actors tend to agree. The EU may be an attractive partner, but it is 
also seen as ineffective with diminishing capabilities, and internally divided (European 
Commission 2014, pp. 45-7). For example, Jonathan Holslag (2011, p. 310) concludes that 
the ‘idea that Europe will continue to fail to deliver as a strategic player is becoming more 
and more common among Chinese experts and officials’.  
Of course, the EU is not the only actor whose security strategies have been criticised, 
as the Freedman quote above indicates. The 2015 US National Security Strategy was 
described as vague, lacking a clear foreign policy direction, and ‘so innocuous that 
Republican presidential hopefuls have not even bothered to attack it’ (Goldgeier and Suri 
2015, p. 39). But while US strategy declarations may be found wanting, it is still arguably the 
most powerful state in the international system, which enjoys internal and external legitimacy 
6 
 
as such. The same cannot be said of the EU, which is why an absence of strategic direction 
poses more of a fundamental problem: if the EU cannot get its act together, then the 
continued existence of the EU can be questioned. The current internal contestation of the EU 
is so high that predictions of its demise – in the event of Brexit, in the event of populist 
parties taking over in France or the Netherlands, and so on – are commonplace. In this 
internal context, then, a declaration such as the EU Global Strategy takes on a particularly 
symbolic purpose, for it represents an attempt to maintain unity and therefore the EU itself.  
The EU has struggled with strategy because it is a complex, intergovernmental 
organisation. Although decision-making in trade policy is formally supranational, most of the 
EU’s external relations have to be agreed by unanimity. The need for the EU member states 
to compromise leads to an avoidance of issues that may spark too much conflict, so hard 
decisions tend not to be taken. Hence, the EU’s long-term foreign policy goals are usually 
uncontroversial and fairly vague. Prioritising amongst the (numerous) various objectives is 
almost impossible: each member state has its own priorities (what decades ago Stanley 
Hoffmann (1966) termed the ‘logic of diversity’), and reaching agreement on an EU set of 
priorities would require trade-offs which may simply be too difficult to negotiate (Smith 
2014, chapter 9; Müller 2016). Reaction and crisis management tend to characterise EU 
external relations, rather than long-term planning, as Sven Biscop (2012) has argued:  
For in the absence of clear priorities, the EU rarely takes to the initiative on 
the key foreign policy issues of the moment (contrary to the other great 
powers) or, when it does, its initiatives tend to be fragmented and stove-piped. 
Consequently, it is not very successful in prevention, despite its rhetoric, and 
to which it has not been able to prevent, it tends to react late. Furthermore, the 
allocation of the means bears no relation to any prioritization of objectives. 
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These obstacles, however, have not stopped the EU from putting forward strategies and 
action plans. There is, in other words, recognition that the EU needs agreement on what its 
common objectives are and how to achieve them. The rest of this article then considers 
whether the EUGS represents an improvement on previous strategies: has the very 
challenging internal and external context prompted the EU and its member states to be more 
strategic?  
 
2. Why an EU Global Strategy in 2016? 
The EU has on several occasions in the past declared its main objectives in the field of 
foreign relations (see European Council 1988; Council of Foreign Ministers 1992), including: 
preserving international peace and security; strengthening the United Nations; strengthening 
democracy, human rights, good governance, and regional cooperation around the world; and 
contributing to conflict prevention and settlement. These were not, however, declared in the 
context of a strategy. 
In 2003, the efforts to specify EU foreign and security policy aims became more 
serious. In 1999, the EU member states had agreed to build EU military capability with a 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), so that the EU could implement foreign 
policy decisions that had defence implications. But as Biscop (2005, p. 13) notes, there was 
little agreement beyond that, with unanswered questions about the scope of EU foreign and 
security policy ambitions, the role that military instruments should play in EU foreign policy, 
and the relationship of the EU to NATO. During the European Convention, which in 2002-03 
drafted the doomed EU constitutional treaty (which eventually was transformed into the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty), the need for an agreed approach to security was discussed, but not followed.  
However, by 2003, the external context was changing, with a more aggressive Bush 
administration in the US, the global war on terror, and the war in Iraq. The EU member states 
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had experienced a severe split over the Iraq war, but still felt a need to distance themselves 
from the Bush administration’s policies. According to Christoph Meyer, the initiative for the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) came from the Political and Security Committee, which is 
composed of member state ambassadors and responsible for common foreign, security and 
defence policy. Therefore, CSDP actors 
had a key impact on the formulation of a document, which represents a 
substantial shift away from the “civil power” leitbild towards a Union that 
aims to develop autonomy in defence matters and considers the use of military 
force a legitimate option to tackle security threats (Meyer 2005, p. 538). 
The ESS was drafted in mid-2003, and agreed formally by the European Council in 
December 2003 (European Union 2003). It declares that the EU has three core strategic 
objectives:  
• addressing security threats: terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 
regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime;  
• enhancing security in the EU’s neighbourhood, by, for example, building relations with 
the Mediterranean and East European states; and  
• creating an international order based on ‘effective multilateralism’, which entails 
upholding international law and strengthening the United Nations. 
The ESS made it clear that none of the threats could be addressed with purely military 
means, and that ‘preventive engagement’ (not pre-emptive coercion, such as that favoured by 
the US vis-à-vis Iraq) is the best way to try to ensure that situations do not escalate or 
deteriorate. The ESS calls for more coherent policies, bringing together different instruments 
including aid, military capabilities, trade, environmental policies, and so on.  The novelty 
here was that military capabilities were so explicitly included in the EU’s approach, even 
though there is a shared and clear preference to intervene earlier with a broad range of 
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instruments and thus perhaps reduce the need to use military means (Biscop 2005, p. 26). But 
the ESS did not set out clear priorities, link specific resources to the fulfilment of specific 
objectives, or provide for regular assessment of its implementation.  
A few years after the ESS was agreed, there were calls from several member states for a 
new strategy, but crucially, Germany and the UK were particularly unenthusiastic (Müller 
2016, p. 368). In 2008, all that could be agreed was an implementation report on the 2003 
ESS, which argued that the EU had to become ‘more strategic in our thinking, and more 
effective and visible around the world’ (European Union 2008, p. 2). It added a few new 
areas that the EU needed to address, including the security implications of climate change, 
energy security and cybersecurity. But the timing was awful; within months the EU was 
consumed by the Eurozone crisis, which drained attention and resources away from foreign 
policy generally. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy between 
2009 and 2014, Catherine Ashton, was not in favour of drafting another strategy. 
 However, once again the changing global situation (the rise of the BRICs, the 
growing instability in the neighbourhood after the Arab Spring), along with entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty (on 1 December 2009), convinced some member states that a new 
strategy was necessary. In July 2012, the foreign ministers of four of those states (Italy, 
Poland, Spain and Sweden) initiated the ‘European Global Strategy’ project, charging four 
think tanks with producing a report which could be seen as the draft of an EU-wide global 
strategy (International Affairs Institute et al 2013). Although Mogherini became Italian 
foreign minister after this initiative was taken (she served from February to October 2014), 
she clearly came from a context in which the push for a new strategy had originated.  
Within months of assuming the post of High Representative, Mogherini decided that 
she needed to produce a new strategy. In December 2013, the European Council had agreed 
to give the High Representative (then Catherine Ashton) a mandate to produce a report on 
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‘the impact of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 
2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with 
the Member States’ (European Council 2013). This was not a mandate to produce a new 
strategy, but Mogherini was intent on getting one (Tocci 2015, p. 118; Tocci 2016). In June 
2015, she presented a report on the ‘European Union in a changing global environment’ to 
the European Council, which then agreed it would be the basis for a new strategy on EU 
foreign and security policy (European External Action Service 2015; European Council 
2016). The European Council’s acquiescence came about also because events in the broader 
neighbourhood, from Ukraine and Turkey to Syria and Egypt and the Sahel, were illustrating 
patently that the EU was surrounded by an arc of crisis. 
 The process of producing the new strategy differed from previous processes. The 
European Security Strategy in 2003 was drafted by the office of Javier Solana, the first High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1999-2009). It was discussed in 
three seminars in the autumn of 2003, with officials from member states, future member 
states, EU institutions, academic experts, NGO representatives, and the media (Biscop 2005, 
p. 13). However, William Wallace (forthcoming) argues that the ESS was not discussed at 
length by the foreign ministers when they agreed it, and afterwards, received very little 
attention in the media or parliaments of EU member states.  
In contrast Mogherini and the EEAS conducted a more open consultation process with 
the member states, think tanks around the EU and civil society organisations, although some 
member states complained that they were not consulted sufficiently and that Mogherini was 
pursuing her own agenda too much (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker 2015, pp. 207-8). The final 
pages of the EUGS contain a long list of all the organisations that were consulted. The 
consultation process was mostly internal (intra-EU), although according to the EUGS 
acknowledgements, some ‘third countries’ also contributed ideas: Brazil, Georgia, Japan, 
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Norway, and the US. The extent of the consultation process may mean that the EUGS will 
have a wider resonance than previous strategies, as a larger community could feel some 
ownership of it. 
 The EUGS itself is a much longer document than the 2003 ESS and the 2008 report 
on the implementation of the ESS. The EUGS also differs in tone. The ESS began with words 
that now seem other-worldly: ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.’ 
This despite the fact that the EU member states and EU membership candidates had been 
visibly and rancorously divided over the war in Iraq in early 2003, with doubts raised about 
the durability of the common foreign and security policy (see Hill, 2004). The ESS was thus 
both a European response to the external context and a way to demonstrate internal unity.  
 The EUGS is considerably more downbeat. Mogherini’s forward notes that ‘the 
purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned’ and ‘our wider region has become 
more unstable and more insecure’. The EEAS paper that sparked the consultation process for 
the EUGS declared bleakly, ‘It is becoming a more dangerous world’ (European External 
Action Service 2015, p. 6). Nathalie Tocci (2015, p. 116), a special adviser to Mogherini, 
argues that ‘we live in more far more turbulent times than we did back then…’ While this can 
be questioned (wars were raging in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 after all), it is nonetheless 
notable that both major EU strategies were born out of a sense that the EU was in a severe 
crisis and surrounded by crises, but the ESS struck a more optimistic (perhaps naively) tone. 
 The EUGS begins by listing the shared interests and principles of the EU (see box 1). 
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Box 1: EU shared interests and principles in the EUGS 
Advancing the prosperity of its people 
Promoting a rules-based global order 
Principled pragmatism: a realistic assessment of the strategic 
environment coupled with an idealistic aspiration to advance a 
better world 
Engagement with the wider world 
Strong sense of responsibility, to address root causes of conflict and 
poverty, and promote human rights 
 
Based on these shared interests, the EUGS declares there are five priorities for EU external 
action (see box 2). 
Box 2: Priorities for EU external action in the EUGS 
The security of the Union, understood in the sense of addressing 
threats to security (not keeping the Union intact) 
State and societal resilience to the East and South of the EU 
An integrated approach to conflicts 
Cooperative regional orders  




According to Tocci, the EUGS was going to indicate a set of common interests and 
goals, and the means to achieve them. It ‘would bring together into a coherent whole all the 
dimensions of EU external action, security and non-security related’ (Tocci 2015, p. 117). 
This would reflect also the institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty, which bring together 
the various external relations bits of the EU in a way that previous treaty reforms had not. 
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 The EUGS devotes considerably more space to how the EU will pursue its objectives 
than was the case in the ESS, and mentions a wide variety of relevant EU policy areas. Thus, 
the EU has to ‘invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union’ (European Union 2016, 
p. 44). Investment in all dimensions of foreign policy has to increase, though there is a strong 
and sustained focus on defence policy and military capabilities. The EUGS calls for member 
states to reach a ‘sufficient level of expenditure’ on defence, including on procurement and 
research and technology. Intelligence gathering and sharing must improve. The CSDP must 
become more effective, and a capacity to deploy military forces and civilian personnel 
rapidly has to be improved. The EU’s ability to respond to challenges must also be boosted 
by improving diplomatic action. Development aid should become more flexible, so that funds 
can be shifted rapidly to respond to crises. The EU should ‘join up’ its external action in areas 
such as energy diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and economic diplomacy; internal and external 
security; security and development policy; and human rights and gender issues (European 
Union 2016, pp. 44-51).  
 
3. How strategic is the EUGS? 
It has become a truism to note that the EU is now in the midst of unprecedented turmoil. 
Externally, severe instability, conflict and gross human rights abuses are ongoing on Europe’s 
southern and eastern periphery, which have also generated refugee flows to which EU 
member states have failed to respond in a coherent and unified manner. There has been more 
agreement on short-term responses to challenges from a revisionist and authoritarian Russia, 
but little indication of a long-term strategy. The election of Donald Trump as US president 
presents yet another challenge, as the foreign policy positions he presented during the 
campaign were alarming for many in the EU and seemed to call into question the 
international liberal order in which the EU has been able to develop; he expressed highly 
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favourable views of Russian President Vladimir Putin and very negative views of 
international trade and NATO. Internally, the rise of populism, illiberalism and radicalism 
across EU member states poses a particular threat to European unity and its capacity to 
address these challenges and adjust to global power shifts. The likely exit of the UK from the 
EU before 2020 obviously exacerbates these trends. 
 Does the EUGS provide the EU with a plan for dealing with this turmoil? 
Commentators have mixed views. Biscop (2016, p. 1) asks ‘whether it gives us something to 
work with to render EU foreign and security policy more effective. The answer is: yes, and 
quite a lot.’ Kristina Kausch (2016) argues that Mogherini and her team, and the European 
Council, should be proud of the EUGS: it ‘reveals a good deal of sensible and innovative 
thinking amid a generally toned-down level of transformative rhetoric’, and it is ‘a forceful 
reminder that the union stands for a liberal internationalist world order that Europeans need to 
stand up for much more vigorously.’ Annegret Bendiek (2016) is less positive: ‘This 
document, however, largely lacks the core features of a strategy: a clearly stated objective, a 
defined (longer) timeframe, and a methodical approach.’  
The rest of this section assesses the EUGS against the elements of a coherent and 
useful strategy outlined in section 1. As Table 1 below indicates, the picture is rather mixed: 
Table 1: Assessment of EUGS 
Elements of a coherent strategy Presence of those elements in the EUGS 
Agreement on shared interests and values of 
EU and member states 
Yes 
Agreement on set of objectives derived from 
shared interests and values 
Yes, though objectives are very broad 
Prioritisation of objectives To a very limited extent 
Assessment of the challenges and To a limited extent 
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opportunities that the external context (and 
external actors) presents for the fulfilment of 
the objectives 
Assessment of instruments and resources 
necessary to achieve objectives within 
specific time frame, decisions on directing 
resources to fulfilling priorities, and specific 
instruments and actors devoting to 
implementing decisions 
No 
Provisions for regular monitoring and 
assessment of progress made 
Yes, though basis for assessment of progress 
not clear  
 
The EUGS does set out a list of very broad shared values, interests and objectives (see 
Boxes 1 and 2 above) that are quite similar to EU foreign policy objectives set out previously. 
The EU has long sought to promote a rules-based global order (centred on the United 
Nations), engage with the wider world, address the root causes of conflict and poverty, 
promote human rights, enhance the security of the EU, and foster regional cooperation 
around the world.  
Prioritisation, however, is still clearly a challenge for the EU. Under each of the 
separate headings in the EUGS on the EU’s five priorities, there are quite long lists of things 
the EU ‘will’ (read ‘should’) do. Indeed, there are over 25 pages on the EU’s priorities (pp. 
18-44). As Hanns W. Maull (2016, p. 35) notes, ‘if all those are “priorities”, one wonders 
about the secondary goals of the EU in world affairs’. In addition, the EUGS is full of 
exhortations of what should be done, without strong indications of how or when these 
priorities will be met, or which are more important. Some of these exhortations are relatively 
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practical, such as supporting neighbouring countries to implement Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreements (European Union 2016, p. 25) or not recognising Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea (p. 33). But much of the content of these sections is fairly vague, as in 
‘the EU will live up to its values internally and externally’, to help counter terrorism (p. 21), 
or will ‘invest in [conflict] prevention, resolution and destabilisation, and avoid premature 
disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere’ (pp. 28-9).  
The objectives that are set out in the EUGS are more ‘realistic’ than in previous 
strategies, where the clear sense was that the EU was a ‘force for good’ in the world. Realists 
have long been more sceptical: Adrian Hyde-Price (2008, p. 31), for example, argued that the 
EU had become the ‘institutional repository of the second-hand normative concerns of EU 
member states’, and this meant that the EU was not only blind to perceptions that it was not 
always seen as a force for good, but was also weak and ineffective in protecting the economic 
and security interests of its member states. The EUGS contains an explicit acknowledgement 
that ‘principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead’, meaning that 
the EU will ‘engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to 
contingency’ (European Union 2016, p. 16). This is, Biscop (2016, p. 1) notes, considerably 
more realistic than the ESS, and indicates that the EU faces internal limits (capability) and 
external limits (other actors’ preferences), and must be more ‘modest’. 
However, although the discussion document that led to the EUGS presented quite 
starkly the crises surrounding the EU (European External Action Service 2015), the EUGS 
arguably does not sufficiently link the challenges or opportunities they pose to the fulfilment 
of the EU’s objectives. The EUGS also does not acknowledge the resistance the EU faces 
globally: the EU’s image is not universally a positive one, as numerous researchers have 
shown (see, for example Chaban, Elgstrom and Holland 2007), and as power diffuses 
internationally, Europe inevitably will struggle to exercise influence.  
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There are several examples of the absence of a consideration of the external context in 
the EUGS. Firstly, the EUGS indicates that enlargement policy is to be ‘credible’, and the 
accession process is to proceed, but the enormous challenges there are not tackled (European 
Union 2016, pp. 24-5). There appears to be almost no enthusiasm within the EU for further 
enlargement (indeed ‘contraction’, with Brexit, is one of the current preoccupations), and 
progress towards meeting the EU’s membership conditions has stalled or reversed in many of 
the candidate countries, above all Turkey. Secondly, the EUGS states that the EU will foster 
dialogue and negotiation regarding the conflicts in Syria and Libya (European Union 2016, p. 
34). Yet it does not indicate how the EU could overcome the considerable difficulties this 
entails: how, and on what basis, would the EU work with Russia or Turkey on Syria, for 
example? Thirdly, there is much in the EUGS about a commitment to reforming the UN (pp. 
39-40), but Peter van Ham (2016, p. 23) asks how the EU can succeed in reforming global 
governance ‘now that the UK is no longer obliged to strive towards a common European 
approach within the EU?’ Thus while ‘principled pragmatism’ is a step towards 
acknowledging ‘contingency’, there is still more wishful thinking than realistic assessments 
in the EUGS.  
The absence of a realistic assessment of the external context and the EU’s resources is 
also apparent in the aim to work at the local level in post-conflict situations, to ‘foster 
inclusive governance at all levels’ (European Union 2016, p. 31). Yet in volatile, post-
conflict situations, reaching out to local actors is risky and potentially destabilising, but also 
difficult logistically. As Séverine Autessere (2014) has shown, the dominant mode of 
operation of international actors in such situations actually prevents local authorship and 
decreases local ownership. Thematic expertise is valued over local expertise, and 
technocratic, top-down solutions to complex problems are favoured. Foreign actors rarely 
actually meet many local actors and for security reasons spend little time engaging with the 
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world outside the confines of their own constructed ‘peaceland’. The EUGS does not indicate 
how such obstacles could be overcome by the EU, and there is reason to believe they could 
not, given, for example, that the EEAS rotates personnel in and out of countries just like EU 
member states’ embassies do, thus privileging general over specific expertise. 
In another way, however, the objectives in the EUGS are more ‘realist’ compared to 
previous strategies. The EUGS makes frequent use of the concept of ‘resilience’. As 
Wofgang Wagner and Rosanne Anholt (2016) note, resilience is currently much in vogue in 
discourses about international crisis management and humanitarian disasters, and has been 
used in recent EU documents regarding conflict zones, apparently supplanting other concepts 
such as fragility (see European Commission 2013). Resilience is a step away from previous 
EU rhetoric on democracy promotion, even though in practice, the EU has long tilted more 
towards the promotion of civil and political rights rather than democracy per se, and has 
privileged stability more than the spread of democracy, with the Middle East and North 
Africa the premier examples of this (see, for example, Wetzel and Orbie 2011). Resilience is 
seen by EU officials and policy-makers as the ‘perfect middle ground between over-
ambitious liberal peace-building and the under-ambitious objective of stability’ (Wagner and 
Anholt 2016, p. 415). 
This is still problematic. Wagner and Anholt (2016, p. 419-22) argue that by 
focussing on strengthening a society’s or a state’s capacity to withstand crises, actors 
implementing a resilience strategy avoid tackling the sources of crises, which could include, 
for example, global and/or domestic inequality. Biscop (2016, p. 3) notes that if the EU tries 
to increase the resilience of a state against external threats, then it can end up increasing the 
resilience of a repressive regime. Fostering resilience can merely cement the status quo, 
which may be undesirable. 
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 There are also dilemmas involved in strengthening societal resilience. The EUGS 
states that the EU will do this in the neighbourhood by deepening relations with civil society, 
working with local organisations on issues such as holding governments to account, 
education, and culture. This may or may not work, depending on whether neighbouring 
countries allow foreign support for civil society organisations; increasingly, semi-
authoritarian regimes do not. Russia requires any NGO engaging in ‘political activity’ 
(undefined) that receives foreign funding to register and identify itself as a ‘foreign agent’ 
(Human Rights Watch 2016). In Egypt, government authorisation is required before NGOs 
can accept foreign funding, and foreign and domestic NGOs have been shut down, and 
employees of some NGOs have been arrested and sentenced to prison (Amnesty International 
2016). Even a democracy such as Israel makes it controversial: human rights NGOs must 
reveal that more than half of their funding comes from abroad in all their official reports 
(Beaumont 2016). 
Even more importantly, not only is there an absence of clear priorities, but there is 
also no clear link between the objectives and the resources that are necessary to try to achieve 
them. How much will the EU invest in conflict prevention, for example? How will it avoid 
‘premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere’, given that resources are 
limited? The EUGS is meant to be followed up with concrete actions in a way that the ESS 
was not, but there is still considerable room for slippage between intention and action.  
The EUGS does pay considerable attention to the EU’s own security, and to the need 
to develop much more effective EU military capabilities. Indeed, even though the title of the 
document omits the word ‘security’, it is more focused on the EU’s security and on military 
instruments than the ESS was. The High Representative thus seems to be trying to move the 
EU away from an identity as a normative, ethical or civilian power towards what some have 
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referred to as a ‘normal’ power, that is, a country willing to use power, including military 
power, in its own interests (Hampton 2000; Pacheco Pardo, 2012).  
In the months since the publication of the EUGS, several member states and EU 
officials have pushed publicly for strengthening defence cooperation, along the lines that 
Mogherini laid down in the EUGS. This has arguably acquired new force and urgency after 
Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections, as he has repeatedly indicated that 
he views NATO as a transactional alliance, and that the US will only defend allies that he 
considers to have contributed fairly to the alliance. Trump’s election may prompt quicker and 
more decisive movement on the proposals: indeed, a few days after the election, EU defence 
ministers agreed a significant implementation plan on security and defence (Council of the 
European Union 2016).  
Much of the commentary on these developments has focused on questions of 
capabilities: will the member states cooperate on procurement? Will they spend more on 
defence overall? If the UK does not participate in the CSDP after Brexit, then the EU will 
certainly miss its resources, which are among the most advanced in Europe. How will the loss 
of these resources affect EU capabilities and ambitions? There is also the fundamental issue 
of whether the EU27 share a strategic culture, that is, ‘a pool of sufficiently shared norms, 
beliefs and ideas regarding the means and ends of defence policy’ (Meyer 2005, p. 524). 
There are differences between the EU27 over important issues such as the role that UN 
Security Council authorisation should play in EU decisions to deploy CSDP missions, or the 
use of force more generally (with some member states more willing to use military force than 
others). The UK was not an outlier here, as the differences between French and German 
approaches to Libya and Syria in 2011 demonstrate. Beyond territorial defence, which the 
EUGS stresses (European Union 2016, p. 19), it is not clear how stronger military capabilities 
fit into a global strategy: how will the EU use these capabilities to increase internal and 
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external security? Will the EU be more interventionist, and if so, where? Will it act only with 
the UN Security Council’s authorisation? These are hard questions, and it remains to be seen 
how the EU member states will address them. Military capabilities are not a magic wand, and 
simply having them may not make the EU more effective and influential in any given 
situation.   
 Foreign policy, of course, cannot rely on military power alone, and the EUGS was 
intended to bring together the full range of EU policy instruments. Yet the section of the 
EUGS on instruments, ‘From Vision to Action’ (European Union 2016, pp. 44-51), focuses 
extensively on defence policy, and only to some extent on civilian CSDP capabilities. Only 
one paragraph (p. 45) notes that diplomacy is important and that member states could be 
tasked by the High Representative to implement positions (indeed a useful division of 
labour). Another paragraph notes that development is to become more ‘aligned with our 
strategic priorities’ (p. 48), which might alarm many in the development policy community 
who would prioritise poverty reduction. But this section is rather sparse, compared to the 
external challenges faced by the EU. The further problem here is that Brexit will lead to a 
substantial reduction in the resources available for external action, but the EUGS does not 
appear to take this into account. 
On a much more positive note, a notable change in comparison to the 2003 ESS is 
that the EUGS specifies that every year, the Council, the Commission and the European 
Parliament will reflect on the state of play of the strategy, and that when the EU and the 
member states deem it necessary to agree a new process of strategic reflection, they will do 
so. This goes some way towards instituting a feedback loop, and may thus ensure that the 
EUGS guides policy-making in future, in a way that the ESS never did. Thus, there is 
considerable scope for the High Representative and the EEAS to use the yearly assessments 





The EUGS is considerably more strategic than previous EU strategies, including the 
2003 European Security Strategy, but it still does not meet the standard of a useful strategy 
set out in the first section. This reflects the reality of the intergovernmental framework: the 
EU member states must agree to set priorities and provide the necessary resources to meet 
them, and their willingness and/or ability to do so is not clear.   
How well does the EUGS enable the EU to develop effective foreign policies for a 
changing world? Although the EUGS is indicative of the challenges the EU faces in trying to 
be strategic, it does point to a way in which the EU can strengthen its internal unity and 
legitimacy: through a more robust defence of member states’ security interests. However, if 
the EUGS does enable the EU to unify around a more realist foreign policy, the reactions of 
outsiders may be even less accommodating. As Daniel Thomas (2012, p. 472) noted, 
‘coherence may be necessary for the EU to exert its influence abroad, but it clearly is not 
sufficient in a multi-centric world order where many others do not share the EU’s collective 
policy preferences and are ready to deploy vast resources in pursuit of their goals.’ The EU 
might encounter even more ‘push back’ than it already has, for example, at the UN 
(Laatikainen 2010; Smith 2013).  
By far the largest dilemma now is that Brexit will deprive the EU of attention and 
material resources that are necessary for an effective and influential foreign policy in a more 
‘multi-centric world’. The survival of the EU may depend on the EU27 fully appreciating that 
‘in the world of today, every single EU member state is a small one’, as Mogherini (2016) 
has argued, and that unity is the best way to confront the numerous challenges they face. 
With one large member state, the UK, apparently ignoring that argument already, the 
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